On May 28, 2026, the Supreme Court issued a significant ruling in Rutherford v. United States that narrows the scope of post-conviction relief available to federal inmates serving lengthy sentences under 18 U.S.C. ┬º924(c). By a 6-3 vote, the Court held that sentencing disparities created by nonretroactive statutory amendments cannot serve as ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reasons supporting a sentence reduction under the compassionate-release statute, 18 U.S.C. ┬º3582(c)(1)(A).
The decision targets a strategy that defense counsel had increasingly relied upon following the First Step Act of 2018. That legislation modified the so-called ‘stacking’ provisions of ┬º924(c), under which defendants convicted of multiple firearm offenses in a single prosecution faced consecutive mandatory minimum sentences that often resulted in decades of additional prison time. While Congress reduced these stacked penalties going forward, it expressly declined to make the amendment retroactive. In the years since, many federal courts had permitted defendants serving pre-First Step Act stacked sentences to seek compassionate release by pointing to the dramatic disparity between their punishment and what a similarly situated defendant would receive today.
The Supreme Court rejected this approach. The majority emphasized that Congress’s deliberate choice to withhold retroactivity reflects an intentional policy decisionΓÇöone that courts may not circumvent through the compassionate-release mechanism. In the Court’s view, disparities flowing from nonretroactive penalty changes are ordinary rather than extraordinary, and permitting judges to undo sentences Congress chose to leave intact would frustrate the legislative design.
The implications for federal defendants are substantial. Inmates currently serving stacked ┬º924(c) sentences imposed before the First Step Act’s effective date have lost what had become one of the most viable avenues for relief. The ruling also signals a broader judicial reluctance to use compassionate release as a vehicle for addressing congressional sentencing reforms more generally. Defense counsel evaluating post-conviction strategies will need to identify other groundsΓÇösuch as serious medical conditions, family circumstances, or rehabilitation evidenceΓÇöthat fall within the traditional understanding of extraordinary and compelling reasons.
This article is intended for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. Individuals affected by these issues should consult qualified counsel for guidance tailored to their specific circumstances.